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Helms Burton: Social Policy and Norm Definition
Manuel A. Rodriguez*

Introduction
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, popularly
know as the Helms Burton Act, is defensible when reviewed from the
historical and foreign policy context, U.S. national security perspective,
Cuban social concerns, and interpretations of current and developing
international law. It is imperative that any review of Helms Burton be
filtered through these considerations, which provide much greater
context then currently in fashion. Criticisms of Helms Burton have been
focused on the narrow constructions of current international law.
Contemporary criticism has often ignored these foreign policy, social,
and international law considerations against which Helms Burton was
developed. Discussion of these considerations would mitigate much of
the criticism.
I.

I.

Background

The Act
President Clinton enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act in March of 1996.1 The Act is divided into four Titles, or
components, whose aim is to implement specific policies and foreign
policy goals regarding the nation of Cuba. z Title I of the Act is largely a
codification of current American policy regarding economic sanctions
and embargoes of Cuba. 3 Title II of the Act is a promise of economic
assistance to a democratic Cuba and the requirements and factors that
A.
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1Juan Azel, Free Trade in the Western HemisphereSymposium: What's All the
Commotion About? InternationalAttacks on the Validity of the Cuban Liberty
and DemocraticSolidarityAct, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 703, 4 (1997)
[hereinafter Azel].
2H.R. 927, 104 th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter H.R.].
3
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would authorize this assistance.4 Title III of the Act "creates a federal
cause of action, on behalf of U.S. citizens whose property was
confiscated without compensation by Cuba, against those who traffic in
that property.",5 It is this section of
the Act that has generated significant controversy and which has been
widely assailed as extraterritorial in nature and contrary to international,
law and norms.6 Because of foreign indignation over the provisions of
Title III, the right to bring lawsuits has been continuously suspended
since the original enactment of the Act.7
Finally, Title IV provides for the exclusion from the United
States of foreign nationals "who have confiscated property of United
States nationals or who traffic in such property."8 Included within the
Act are statements of Congressional findings and purposes which attempt
to define the Act almost completely as a function of American foreign
policy and America's overarching view of the Castro regime as a morally
reprehensible and illegitimate government which consistently violates
international law both domestically and abroad. 9
The Historical Relationship between the United States and
Cuba
As a means of analyzing the legal and political implications of
the Act, it is important to filter this analysis through the prism of the rich
historical context of U.S./Cuba relations throughout the last century. This
historical dimension has been shared with few other nations in
contemporary American history. The United States and Cuba have
historically developed ties unlike most other countries. The sinking of
the battleship Maine in the latter half of the 1911 century culminated in
the Spanish-American war. American soldiers fought and died to liberate
Cuba of its Spanish oppressors and instill in the island the virtues of selfgovernance and democracy. The tumultuous and often sordid history of
the island following the Spanish-American war is undisputed and cannot
B.

4id.

5 Brice M. Clagett, International Symposium on the Cuban Liberty and
DemocraticSolidarity (Libertad)Act of 1996: The Controversy Over Title III of
the Helms-Burton Act: Who Is BreakingInternationalLaw - The United States,
or the States That Have Made Themselves Co-Conspirators With Cuba in Its
Unlawful Confiscations? 30 GEO.WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 271, 2 (1997)
[hereinafter Clagett].
Id. at 272.
7
Id. at 272.
8 H.R., supranote 2.
9Id.
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be characterized as anything but periods of dictatorship and corruption
interspersed with brief experiments in democracy. The ferocious
dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista culminated in an idealistic vision of a
Cuba liberated of its chains where the masses would achieve the elusive
dream of equality. This dream however, proved to be short-lived, as
Fidel Castro commandeered the island as his personal domain under the
guise of communism.
Castro's socialist visions proved to be nothing more than the
delusions of a dictator who perpetrated a hoax on the Cuban people and
the world, and who single-handedly proceeded to dismantle and destroy
the island and usurp the hopes and dreams
of several generations of Cubans.10 Cuba today is in ruins, little more
then a shell of its former self and no longer the pearl of the Caribbean.
Grotesque inequality between the Communist apparatchiks and those
they rule is common. Cuba's infrastructure crumbles for want of repair
and its people drive automobiles considered antiques in the United
States. The vast majority rides bicycles on a daily basis. They do this not
to work or produce, but to stand in line for meager rations that consist of
little more than rice and beans. The vast majority have ceased productive
work in favor of the underground economy, which is essentially a crude
economy based on the medieval concepts of barter and exchange.
Doctors are paid more to drive taxis then to deliver babies, while women
walk the streets in search of clients, an open secret among the European
nationals who frequent Cuba as tourists.
Notions of U.S. interventionism and colonialism regarding the
island nation typify criticism of the Act. Critics deride the notion of U.S.
foreign policy directed at crippling or hindering the economy of a
sovereign state and Cuba's attempts at self-definition vis-h-vis its
socialist conventions and centralized economic principles. Any attempt
to constrain the analysis of the Act along traditional paradigmatic norms
of international law and contemporary notions of extraterritorial behavior
would ignore the 100-year relationship that has shaped and defined
Cuban-American ties. The simple answer would ignore the thousands of
American lives and service members lost in the Spanish-American war in
their successful attempt to liberate the island from its Spanish oppressors.
The degree of interconnectedness between the two nations has
historically been great, and the isolationist aberration of the current
Cuban regime has not diminished the United States' involvement in and
desire to see Cuba restored to democracy. Asserting that this behavior is
paternalistic and colonial is to ignore the historical antecedents that have
'0 See id.
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governed the relationship. The United States does not assert colonial
intentions with respect to Cuba, but rather seeks to insure its freedom.'

M.

The Social Dimensions of the Act
The social context offers greater support for Helms Burton than
even the historical context. Human rights violations in Cuba have been
well defined and noted by many charitable groups and organizations.
There are circumstances in which doing business with a gross human
rights violator itself breaches some duty to the international community
sufficient to expose a state or its entities to unilateral economic
retaliation from other states. International human rights laws authorize
states to prescribe and punish violations wherever they occur, and
prohibit not only the direct commission of these acts, but
their aiding and abetting. The sale of weapons to a genocidal state
presumably would violate the international prohibition against genocide,
for example, and justify economic retaliation against the supplying state.
The trials of the Nuremberg industrialists imputed international criminal
liability to business entities that assisted the Nazi regime. If doing
business with a gross human rights violator can be analogized to aiding
breached its
and abetting, a third party entity may have sufficiently
12
retaliation.
peaceful
justify
to
duties
international
The United States would be negligent in allowing this complicity
to occur ninety-five miles from its shores. Admittedly, the United States
has not pursued this policy with other states that routinely and
grotesquely violate the human rights of its citizens. The most obvious
example of this is China, with whom the United States actively trades
and in fact has conferred most favored nation trading status ("MFN").
Some justifications for this bifurcation in policy are readily apparent,
though. China represents a direct threat to the security and well being of
the United States and the world, and is considered by many a military
superpower. The United States, as a superpower and fiduciary of global
security has chosen a policy of engagement rather than confrontation in
attempting to diffuse the confrontational nature of the relationship, rather
than pursuing long abandoned Cold War policies of isolation and NATO
encroachment. China's human rights abuses are even more egregious
than those of Cuba's, yet the security implications and costs of applying
unilateral and secondary trade sanctions to China may far outweigh the
11Id.
12 Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalizationand U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26
YALE J.INT'L L. 1, 64 (2001) [hereinafter Cleveland].
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limited benefits and abilities of the United States to effect change in this
giant country. Foreign policy considerations dictate that the United States
engage the Chinese rather than isolate them. It also may be unlikely that
unilateral trade sanctions would work to effect change within a nation of
this size. Clear manifestations of this policy could be seen in the United
States' granting to China of MFN trading status. It was abundantly clear
that "[b]usiness support for trade relations with China and the need for
China's cooperation with non-nuclear proliferation policies toward North
Korea led President Clinton to renew China's MFN status and de-link
trade from human rights in 1994. ''13 However, the imposition of
unilateral economic sanctions cannot be underestimated, as sanctions can
process of norm definition and internalization on
contribute to the
14
various levels.

Sanctions contribute to domestic internalization by
incorporating attention to human rights concerns into the
political processes of the sanctioning state. They also
contribute to transnational internalization by the broader
international community by attracting foreign attention to
human rights concerns and generating multilateral pressure on
the target state. Unilateral action [such as Helms Burton] can
and incorporation of rights
thus contribute to the definition
15
into the international system.
This argument presupposes that economic sanctions can play a broader
role in the development of the international system rather than merely
seeking to alter a specific state's behavior.1 6 Harold Koh asserts:
[T]hat this process occurs through repeat interactions between
states and a variety of domestic and transnational actors,
which produce interpretations of applicable global norms and
ultimately the internalization of those norms into states'
domestic values and processes. Rather than focusing narrowly
on punitive interactions between states, Koh sees repeated
participation in transnational legal processes is the key factor
with
in the move from onetime grudging compliance
17
international norms to habitual internalized obedience.

13id.

at44.

14Id. at 17.
15

Id. at7.

16Id.at 6.
17id.
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Unfortunately, foreign policy and global security concerns may
mitigate the benefits of this policy towards countries capable of global
military destabilization, such as China.
The National Security Dimension
Further support for the overall policy implications of the
Helms Burton Act, whose coercive influence attempts to promote and
transition Cuba away from the Castro regime and towards democracy,
lies in Cuba's hemispheric security threat.
IV.

Cuban foreign policy has traditionally insisted on the subversion
of democratic institutions in South and Central America through indirect
military force and assistance. Many of these threats have been realized,
as in the case of Nicaragua. Cuban Armed Forces and military assistance
were directly implicated in assisting the Sandinistas to achieve their
goals. Cuban foreign policy has consistently advocated the expansion of
its socialist ideas worldwide, and has engaged its military in areas as
geographically distant as Angola.' 8 For approximately 30 years,
beginning in the 1960s, Cuba engaged in almost relentless efforts to
subvert democratic institutions throughout Latin America. 19 This period
ended only with the implosion of the Cuban economy and its inability to
secure financing from the former Soviet bloc to modernize its military. In
many respects, Cuba behaved and reacted much like a military
superpower, wielding its influence wherever and whenever the Soviets
beckoned.
It is this behavior that cemented America's resolve to isolate
Cuba and deprive it of the vital economic currency it required to sustain
and modernize its military. Cuba's subversive efforts were quite costly,
and required enormous amounts of direct capital infusion, manpower,
and Soviet subsidies to maintain. Beginning with the Cuban missile crisis
in the 1960s, the United States realized that its closest neighbor to the
South was not only a threat militarily but attempting to acquire nuclear
weaponry that could potentially be unleashed against America. American
foreign policy regarding Cuba has been a function of this threat for 40
"'David M. Shamberger, The Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and Effective Vehicle
ForRedressing US. Property Claims in Cuba and Accelerating the Demise of
the CastroRegime, 21 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 497, 497-537 (1998).
19 Klinton W. Alexander, The Helms-Burton Act and the WTO Challenge:
Making A Case for the United States Under the GATT National Security
Exception, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 559, 559-584 (1997) [hereinafter Alexander].
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years.20 Even today, while not having the wherewithal to engage
subversively in remote areas, Cuba's hostile intentions were noted in the
21
downing of two civilian aircraft that briefly migrated into its airspace.
This was known as the Brothers to the Rescue incident.2 2 Cuba's
engagement with many European countries in its efforts to promote
tourism have nonetheless inspired no change in its hostility towards the
United States, and the Helms Burton act was a direct reaction to the
civilian incident.23
Insofar as Helms Burton continues to isolate Cuba and deprive it
of the economic potential to resuscitate its war making capability, Helms
Burton and the embargo have been unqualified successes.24 Complete
deprivation of the economic inputs required to revive its military
capacity must be a unilateral goal of the United States. The fact that our
European neighbors do not perceive Cuba as a military threat is a factor
and a function of the geographic distance between them and Cuba.
Predictably, Cuba is unlikely to engage in remote conflicts requiring vast
sums of capital and dramatic subsidies because it lacks an adequate
source of funding. This said, however, the Cuban military remains
among the most prepared and armed in the Western Hemisphere, and as
recently demonstrated, is willing to sacrifice two civilian aircraft to
dramatically emphasize this point.25 The overall policy guidelines of
Helms Burton evidenced by Title I of the Act must not only remain in
place but must be strengthened. Until and unless the Cuban government
begins the process of dismantling its offensive capability to a purely
defensive posture or demilitarizes altogether, the United States should
not undermine the policy guidelines of Title I or of the economic
embargo against Cuba.
It has been noted that sanctions may have a number of less
tangible but nevertheless desirable effects on the behavior of both the
target and other foreign states. As Richard Parker puts it, the failure of
sanctions to topple Castro is often cited as support for the inefficacy of
economic sanctions employed for high foreign policy purposes. Yet the
alert citizen and policymaker might well ask, did sanctions nonetheless
weakened Castro's ability to finance counter-revolutionary movements
2

Id. at 562.

21

id.

2 Id.

See id. at 563.
4Id. at 562.
'5Id. at 563.
'3
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in Latin America; did they force the Soviet Union to deplete its own
resources subsidizing Castro; and/or did economic sanctions force Castro
to liberalize his state run economy more than he otherwise might have
done? Did the hardships imposed by sanctions on Cuba serve to deter
other countries from choosing the Communist and expansionist path
during those years26 when international communism still had some
charisma overseas?
National security concerns may not seem as prescient given the
economic demise of the Cuban economy and its ability to generate
conflict, yet similar sanctions have been successfully applied more
recently by the United States to Iraq.27 The economic sanctions applied
to Iraq were primarily motivated to "undermine Saddam Hussein's grip
on power and to ensure that the Iraqi government will give the U.N.
special commission charged with eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction unfettered access to disputed sites." 2 The United States
believes that Hussein is a ruthless dictator who can be constrained only
through the implementation of sanctions and threats. 29 The same
argument can also be raised by the United States against the Cuban
regime, which has described Castro as a "ruthless dictator, responsible
for carrying out human rights abuses on his
own soil and fostering Communist insurgency throughout Central
America."30
Title M and Property Expropriation
The international outcry over the supposed extraterritorial
provisions of the Helms Burton act, namely, Title III are quite defensible
within the context of international law and conflict resolution. Castro's
confiscation of private property and expropriation of foreigners' property
without compensation to its owners became one of the most egregious
transgressions of Cuban and international law.3 1 Expropriation of
V.

Cleveland, supra note 12, at 86.
supra note 19, at 573.
2
1Id. at 573.
26

27 Alexander,

29 id.
30

id.
Kathleen S. Adams, SubchapterIII of the Helms Burton Act: A Reasonable
Assertion of United States ExtraterritorialJurisdiction?21 HAMLINE L. REV.
147, 147-80 (1997).
31
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property held by American interests was clearly violative of international
laws and standards in effect in the 1960S.32 It is also noted that:

Under traditional principles of sovereignty, the Cuban
government's expropriations would have been legal ifjustified
by public purpose and by the payment of prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation to the private owner. Under
customary international law, an expropriating state acts in
clear violation of customary international law if it fails to
provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to the
private owner. An expropriation is also illegal if it "includes
and
interference with the assets of international organizations
33
taking contrary to promises amounting to estoppels.
Additionally, the confiscation of property owned by Cubans
clearly violated Cuba's Constitution of 1940, which was still the guiding
document of Cuban jurisprudence, though the current dictator, Fulgencio
Batista, had effectively usurped the legitimate mechanism of
constitutional amendment. 4 The 1940 Constitution, though, guaranteed
Cuban citizens the right to own and use property without interference
from the government and established equitable compensation guidelines
when property was otherwise confiscated or appropriated for the public
domain.3 5 These mass expropriations from both American and Cuban
interests were gross human rights violations and violated one of the most
ancient and time-honored of individual privilege: the notion of property
rights.3 6 Although confiscation of property owned by Cubans was
technically not violative of then current international standards, at a
minimum these confiscations were violative of the human rights of their
owners, especially when motivated by political and social dogma. 7
Castro's regime discriminatorily confiscated property from the previous

Robert E. Freer, Jr., Presentation For The Fifth Annual Meeting: Association
For The Study Of The Cuban Economy, 13 (August 12, 1995) (transcript
at Freer & McGarry, P.C.) [hereinafter Freer].
available
33
Id.at 11.
32

Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriationof Property in Cuba: A Historical
and Legal Analysis of the Takings and A Survey of Restitution Schemes ForA
Post-SocialistCuba, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 321, 321-355 (2000)
34

Ortiz].
[hereinafter
35
1Id.at 327.
36
Id. at 323.
37

Id. at 328.
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governments' followers and wielded these confiscations as punishment
for domestic political opposition.38
Finally, as a means of punishing the United States for their
continued criticism of the regime, Castro enacted laws that forcibly
expropriated all U.S. owned businesses and assets in Cuba.39 Effective
compensation has never been provided to either Cuban citizens whose
properties were confiscated or American interests.40 The general rule of
compensation is well established and is directly applicable to the Cuban
government's confiscations. Under U.S. law, the compensation rule
gained informal recognition as the "Hull formula," when U.S. Secretary
of State, Cordell Hull, outlined the requirements of prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation to the Mexican government during a 1939
dispute over Mexico's nationalization of foreign owned oil fields. The
compensation rule is underpinned by a cornerstone of international law,
the international minimum standard... which dictates the supremacy of a
moral standard of the treatment of aliens over national standards.
Although the global community has not reached consensus on the debate,
the international minimum standard has gained increasing support
throughout the twentieth century, including the support of a majority of
states at The Hague Codification Conference and United Nations
affirmation through the General Assembly's 1962 Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty over National Resources.41
Many countries have struggled with the concept of restitution in
post autocratic periods. Most recently, the Germans have struggled to
implement a mechanism fair to both the current in prior owners.
Concepts of restitution are time-honored and well recognized, and Helms
Burton and Title III are simply attempts by the United States to begin to
codify this restitution and ensure its eventual implementation.
Additionally, Title III provides advance notice to the entire world that the
the United States, like many other countries, will seek restitution for its
citizens when the opportunity arises. 42 The mere fact that this property
was illegally confiscated and does not belong to its current owners
should not be in dispute. As noted, restitution schemes have been
frequent throughout history, and although controversial, have gained
contemporary acceptance.

38 m.
39
Id. at
40

332.
Freer, supra note 32, at 11.
41 Id. at 12.
42Id. at 19.
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Criticism of Title III is based on its supposed extraterritorial
nature, but a literal reading of the Act simply provides nationals of the
United States who have had property confiscated by the Cuban
government a mechanism for preventing others from trafficking in
property that belongs to them, and further provides a remedy in U.S.
courts for this trafficking. 43 Furthermore, traffickers in confiscated
property have no claim against the Cuban government for protection of
their interests in expropriated property, nor do they have any viable
defense against suits by U.S. nationals. Their precarious position is due
to the fact that they cannot claim to be bona fide purchasers. By
knowingly and intentionally engaging in joint ventures involving
confiscated property, third party traffickers have tainted their own legal
status with Cuba's international law violations. Libertad is consistent
with international law, which recognizes that effective title cannot
properly be transferred; more specifically, international law recognizes
that a property interest gained through confiscation cannot properly be
transferred. 4
A proper analogy would indicate that someone who knowingly
purchases an item that has been stolen should know that the item is
subject to return to its rightful owner and that she is subject to penalties
for knowingly purchasing the item.45 The supposed extraterritorial effect
of this act is simply a failure of international law to codify what is
commonly understood. 46 Key to this understanding is the world
communities' recent acknowledgment of Jewish restitution efforts due to
the illegal confiscation of property by the Nazis during World War II.
Although initially resisted, most governments involved in this restitution
effort have acknowledged and validated these restitution schemes. Helms
Burton simply attempted to do the same thing and was, as the saying
goes, ahead of its time. The policy implications of Title III further the
state interests of protecting the property rights of United States nationals
and of discouraging international investment in the Cuban economy. This
disincentive to invest in Cuban property conforms to the security policy
implications of weakening -the Cuban economy as a preventive measure
to a gradual renewal of the Cuban military. If understood from both the
practical and policy implications, Title III should survive scrutiny and be
applauded for its attempt to codify a policy that prevents trafficking in
stolen property and which will ultimately result in a restitutionary
43

Id. at 15.

44Id.
41 Id. at3.
46 Id. at3.
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scheme. The United States' visionary attempt to establish restitutionary
schemes to those that have been deprived of their property in violation of
international human rights laws should serve as a model for other
international jurisprudential institutions. Global adoption of the policies
of Title III would uniformly ensure that "businesses and people
throughout the world would 47have little cause to fear the unlawful
confiscation of their property.,
Many governments have been critical of Helms Burton out of
sheer self-interest, given the realization that the current Castro regime
will soon end upon the death to the dictator, and that their investment in
Cuba could be jeopardized by any restitutionary scheme crafted to
compensate the two largest classes of claimants.48 It is estimated that
"claims of U.S. nationals alone, as certified by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, including only simple interest at a modest rate,
now total more than $6 billion."49 This first class of claimants easily
outstrips Cuba's ability to provide restitution.50 An even bigger class of
claimants involves possible restitution to Cubans who fled Cuba and are
living abroad, including those who are now Cuban Americans. Criticism
of restitutionary schemes that involve this class of claimants has been
vocal and fierce.
These arguments ignore the fact that many U.S. citizens of
Cuban origin have resided in United States longer than they resided in
Cuba, and have been productive, law-abiding members of society.
Preventing U.S. citizens of Cuban origin from enjoying the protection
afforded by Section 302's cause of action serves no legitimate interest.
Allowing such citizens to benefit from Section 302's cause of action,
however, advances the foreign policy goals of the Helms Burton Act.s '
Principally, though, any exclusion of this class of claimants
would be constitutionally suspect.5 2 "Excluding a class of U.S. citizens
from sharing in the benefits of U.S. law on the basis of their national
origin violates the equal protection guarantees of the U.S.
Constitution. 5 3 Before Helms Burton, Cubans who immigrated to the
United States and later became citizens of the United States lacked a
forum in which to air their grievances, therefore, the strongest
47

Id. at3.
Ortiz, supranote 34, at 340.
49 Clagett, supranote 5, at 276.
48

so Ortiz, supranote 34, at 344.
51 Shamberger, supranote 18, at 517.
52
Id.at 516.
53 id.
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justification for Title III may be found in the various exceptions to the
general rule that a state may not bring an action on behalf of persons who
were not its nationals at the time of the confiscation. 54 States have
protected the international rights of persons who were not their nationals
by making international agreements and treaties and, particularly
applicable in the present context, through diplomatic action based on
humanitarian concerns on behalf of nonnationals wronged by another
state. These exceptions have come about primarily to mitigate the
problems suffered by stateless or displaced persons and refugees.5 5 A
stateless person is one who lacks both the nationality of the expropriating
state and the nationality of any other state. A refugee or displaced person
is an individual who resides outside his own country but who still bears
the nationality of that country. Despite the different labels, all of these
persons are in essentially the same position; they lack a forum where
they can seek compensation from their government. U.S. nationals who
were Cuban citizens at the time of the confiscation of their property share
the same status as stateless or displaced persons and refugees under
international law. Without a country to bring a claim on their behalf,
under international law in which to
these U.S. nationals lack a forum
56
seek compensation for their loss.
The massive economic and social upheaval created by these
restitution schemes could undermine the viability of any post-Castro
government, given the potential for social unrest and economic
destabilization. 1 While not as serious in dollar value, potential
investment losses by foreign countries to these restitution schemes are in
the billions of dollars. The potential loss of this investment capital may
be a catalyst in igniting current criticism of Helms Burton. Many
countries and their citizens stand to lose substantial amounts of capital
and investment were such restitution schemes to be implemented in the
future. Fierce criticism of Helms Burton is simply a predictor of the
potentially serious international economic and political crises that could
develop between those countries investing heavily in Cuba and the U.S.
owners of expropriated and confiscated Cuban property. In order to avert
this crisis and ensure Cuba's successful transition to democratic
governance and a market-based economy, efforts should be initiated to
minimally develop the outlines of a restitutionary scheme.
54

Azel, supra note 1, at 717-18.

55 id.

56 id.
7 Ortiz, supra note
58Id. at 336.

34, at 336.
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As a measure of U.S. foreign policy, Title III has been highly
effective in "stifling Cuba's economic growth and has twisted the Castro
regime to the brink of financial ruin."5 9 Furthermore, "when compiling a
cost benefit analysis and assessing the potential profits of doing business
in Cuba, future investors must consider Helms Burton and its potential to
mitigate profits by producing extraneous administrative burdens,
subjecting the company to costly litigation, or affecting crucial trade
relations with the U.S."60 These considerations carry, by design, foreign
policy and retaliatory implications to the trafficking state or actors.
Extraterritorial critiques of Helms Burton are much less viable when
viewed through this prism, especially since the supposed extraterritorial
provisions of Helms Burton have in fact never been implemented. 61 The
extraterritorial provisions of Helms Burton remain bargaining tools,
whose design may carry out foreign policy objectives in an indirect
fashion in ways that the United States could not do directly. The creators
of Helms Burton may have realized the far-reaching foreign policy
implications, in spite of the continued suspension of the relevant
provisions of the act.62 These implications have successfully furthered
the foreign policy goals of the United States government for over 40
years towards Cuba, that of isolating and destroying the Cuban economy
and undermining its government. While these objectives may remain
controversial throughout the United States, they remain unchanged by
the current administration, and therefore, valid U.S. policy.
The European Union, The World Trade Organization and
Title IV
The provisions of Title IV of the Helms Burton Act are among
those in which the United States has traditionally remained unassailable
on. These provisions "exclude from entry into the United States any
foreign person, or family member thereof, who has benefited from the
use of expropriated property." 63 These provisions are among the most
defensible of any of the Helms Burton provisions, because the right of a
state to regulate its borders in any way it deems necessary is well
accepted. The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held
VI.

Bernadette Atuahene, The Effectiveness Of International Legislative
Responses To The Helms-Burton Act, 69 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 809, 819 (2000).
60
Id. at 819.
59

61

Id. at 817-18.

62 Id.at 818.
63

Alexander, supra note 19, at 565.
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that the federal power to exclude aliens "is an incident of national
sovereignty" and that it is "the role of the federal government to oversee
matters of national concem." 64 The provisions of Title IV, should
withstand legal scrutiny both domestically and abroad, though soundly
criticized by U.S. allies in Europe. Title IV's applicability has been
affected by recent developments and understandings reached by the
United States and its European allies, as discussed below.
President Bush has again suspended the Title Inl provisions,
which continues the policy of his predecessor, Bill Clinton.65 This
decision was again justified by the need to placate American's European
allies, who would have pressed the issue before the World Trade
Organization.6 6 The European Union would likely have instigated a
formal complaint before the World Trade Organization had Mr. Bush not
invoked the waiver in July of 2001.67 The waiver was the result of an
understanding reached at the EU/US Summit on May 18, 1998, which
was based on the April 1997 Understanding. 68 The Understanding has
several components. The first of these:
[C]ontains a clear commitment on the part of the U.S.
administration to seek from Congress the authority to grant a
waiver from Title IV of Helms Burton Act (visa restrictions)
without delay. With respect to Title I (submission of law
suits against trafficking in expropriated property) of the Helms
Burton Act, the Understanding provides for a U.S.
commitment to continue to waive the right to file lawsuits, so
far done on a six monthly basis and to obtain such a waiver on
a permanent basis. It also addresses the issue of whether or not
EU and U.S. investment assistance agencies should give
assistance to investment projects in illegally expropriated
property. However, the EU will69not apply the disciplines until
the waiver authority is applied.
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The second major element of the Understanding is that the U.S.
will seek to restrain its use of secondary boycotts and unilateral
sanctions. The Understanding also makes clear that the EU still considers
Helms-Burton illegal, and reserves the right to resume its case before the
World Trade Organization should U.S. sanctions be forthcoming or the
waivers not materialize. 70 This compromise, albeit temporary, resolves a
possibly contentious dispute involving the World Trade Organization,
and allows both parties to declare a partial victory. The United States
succeeds in involving the EU in identifying and denying aid to
investment projects involved with expropriated properties, and the EU
receives a waiver of the Title IV provisions. 1
Finally, the United States avoids a diplomatically sensitive
confrontation with the World Trade Organization. If pressed by the
World trade Organization, the United States would almost certainly have
invoked the national security exception, Article XXI, of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 72 "Pursuant to this exception, a
contracting party can escape its obligations under the agreement and take
any action that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests in time of war or other emergency in international
relations." 73 Security interests are inherently self-defining, and states
have nominally taken the position that their definition is unassailable. 74
The EU therefore would ultimately prefer not to challenge the U.S.
implementation of this exception, since they too may need to avail
themselves of its powerful and sweeping language. 75 This exception is
crucial to the maintenance of agreements such as GATT, because they
provide a measure of flexibility, without which, most nations would not
participate.7 6 It stands to reason that avoiding a challenge to the U.S.
implementation of the security exception was in the interests of all
parties involved, since they too might need to avail themselves of its
benefits, and ultimately led to the agreement reached. Thus, the GATT
security exception remains a viable, if not manipulative, means of
70
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creating flexibility within the GATT agreement. 77 Self-definition by
states of their security requirements remains the norm.

Conclusion
The United States continues to achieve foreign policy goals
through the Helms Burton legislation. While many of the provisions of
the Act are controversial, unilateral, and perhaps extraterritorial, most of
the onerous provisions have been continuously delayed, waived or never
implemented. Thus, the Act, by its mere existence, has indirectly
achieved what it could not do directly, that of isolating and undermining
the Castro regime and preventing an influx of foreign investment. By
itself, the Act will not topple the Castro dictatorship, but will continue to
isolate the regime and create a hostile climate for its existence. Should
foreign policy goals and objectives change towards the Castro regime,
the Act could quietly be repealed and its non-enforceable provisions
would evaporate as a footnote to American legislative history. Helms
Burton has encouraged new, non-violent methods of enforcing foreign
policy mandates and created a growing awareness of the consequences of
property confiscations worldwide. These egregious acts have consistently
been deemed throughout history as the manifestations of sovereign
entities, mostly occurring with impunity and little or no accountability to
the dispossessed. Forging accountability often requires bold action and
leadership, which the United States has, to the displeasure of many, once
again provided. History may bear witness that the United States helped
initiate a regime of worldwide accountability and discourse over these
issues.
VII.
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